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Abstract
Dispersion in pay is lower among union members than among non-unionists.  This reflects
two factors.  First, union members and jobs are more homogeneous than their non-union
counterparts.  Second, union wage policies within and across firms lower pay dispersion.
Unions’ minimum wage targets also truncate the lower tail of the union distribution.  There
are two major consequences of these egalitarian union wage policies.  First, the return to
human capital is lower in firms which recognise unions than in the unorganised sector.
Second, unions compress the wage structure by gender, race and occupation.
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Introduction
Throughout most of the twentieth century trade unions have been an important force
tempering the inequality of the distribution of pay.  At the beginning of the century the
Webbs (1902) emphasised the key role of the ‘common rule’ and ‘rate for the job’ in unions’
wage policies.  In the middle of the century – in the years after World War II – Clegg (1970)
reports “Britain was well on the way to a system of industry-wide regulation of all aspects of
industrial relations” (p.206) such that the same job had similar pay among all firms in the
same industry. In the 1960s and 1970s when the locus of collective bargaining gradually
decentralised from industry to the firm or workplace, shop steward combine committees
sought to pursue this egalitarian union role:  “Their most universal function is the exchange of
information about pay and conditions but sometimes they go beyond this to agitate for
equalisation of pay” (Clegg 1970 p.265).  Metcalf (1982) presents evidence that confirms
that, consequently, pay dispersion was lower among union members than their non-union
counterparts in the late 1970s.
Since 1980 there have been profound changes to our system of industrial relations.
The labour market has been deregulated as a consequence of the legislative onslaught against
unions, more intense produce market competition and historically high unemployment levels.
One result of deregulation is a halving in the coverage of collective bargaining - described by
Phelps Brown (1990) as the “counter-revolution of our time” - coupled with the near
abandonment of industry-wide agreements in the private sector (see Metcalf, 1999 for more
details).  The upsurge in the number of cases of union derecognition by management (Brown
et al., 1998), outlawing the closed shop, and complete abandonment of minimum wage
protection between 1993 and 1998 suggests that it is again time to take stock of the effect of
trade unions on the distribution of earnings.
Our aim is to provide a definitive statement of the links between trade unions and the
earnings distribution around the millennium.  In Section 2 union wage policies are discussed
and summarised in the form of six propositions.  Data sources are set out in Section 3.  The
Labour Force Survey provides very full detail on individuals’ pay and characteristics, while
the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey has extensive details on industrial
relations in a nationally representative sample of over 2000 workplaces and further
information on over 28000 workers employed in these workplaces.  Results are set out in
Section 4.  This section contains evidence on links between unionisation and payment
systems, the distribution of earnings, the returns to human capital, the incidence of low pay
and any discrimination against women, blacks and those with health problems.  Summary and
conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2There have been a number of recent, very thorough, studies which test for the impact
of unions on the distribution of pay in the overall economy (see e.g. Bell and Pitt, 1998 and
Gosling and Machin, 1995).  Their particular focus is the contribution to the widening of the
earnings distribution over the last two decades made by the near halving of union
membership.  By contrast, our focus is comparisons between the unorganised and organised
sectors of the labour market at a point in time.  We pay much greater attention to the
industrial relations strategies and tactics underpinning any differences between the two
segments of the labour market and broaden the discussion out to include payment systems,
low pay and discrimination as well as just the distribution of earnings.
Before turning to the body of the paper one interesting conceptual issue needs
addressing.  Union membership has haemorrhaged from around 12 million in 1980 to some 7
million presently.  The number of workers covered by collective bargaining has also fallen
dramatically.  However, union membership and collective bargaining coverage are not the
same thing.  Table 1 presents the evidence.  One quarter of employees are both union
members and covered by collective bargaining.  But 10% of employees are free riders – their
pay and conditions are determined by collective bargaining but they are not union members.
A further 6% are in a union but their pay is not bargained.  Some of this latter group are
teachers and nurses whose pay is set by arbitration and others will, for example, have retained
their union membership when their employer derecognised the union.  The largest group
(59%) are neither union nor covered by collective bargaining.  In our empirical work should
we analyse the effects of collective bargaining coverage which takes account of the large
number of free riders who benefit from union activity, or union membership – because a
surprisingly large number of employees are members even though they are not covered by
collective bargaining? There is no “right” answer to this question.  Therefore in the text we
mainly report the links between union membership and pay and in the appendix counterpart
tables are presented replacing membership with collective bargaining coverage.
2. Union Wage Policies
A stylised industrial relations fact is that pay dispersion among unionised workers is lower
than the spread among their non-union counterparts.  For example Machin (1999) states:
“Trade unions have traditionally been seen as defenders of egalitarian pay structures.  This is
reflected in ‘equal pay for equal work’ notions and the standardisation of pay setting
mechanisms, often in the form of rigid pay scales attached to jobs rather than individuals.”
But it is worth setting out the three routes to this greater equality of pay in the organised
sector in a little more detail.
First, unions reduce pay dispersion within establishments.  Second, union wage
policies lead to a narrower wage dispersion in the organised compared with the unorganised
sector.  However, the strength of this channel, which operates across firms and workplaces,
has been weakened as collective bargaining has become more decentralised.  Third, unions
truncate the bottom tail of the pay distribution by operating a de facto minimum wage policy
in the organised sector whereas there was no minimum wage protection for unorganised
employees at the time (Autumn 1998) the data was collected for this study.  These routes to
predicted lower pay dispersion in the organised sector will be considered in turn.
2.1. Within establishments
Within establishments unions aim to reduce pay dispersion via two operational rules.  First,
unions prefer a single rate of pay for each occupational group whereas in non-union firms
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agreements between unions and management often establish fixed differentials between
occupational groups.  Second, unions prefer seniority-based progression of rates up to a
maximum over individual merit pay.
Union preferences for reduced differentials within firms stem from unions’ desire for
objective standards, organisational considerations and workers solidarity.  Unions would
sooner opt for impartial standards, where pay goes with the job, because of concerns about
favouritism, discrimination and the measurement of the “true” contribution where pay is
subjectively related to the “merit” of the individual.  Next, in nearly all firms median pay is
less than mean pay.  A median voter model of union organisation suggests therefore, that
over half of employees will favour redistribution towards the lower paid.  In workplaces
where multiple unions are present and recognised single table bargaining has become the
norm (see Cully et al., 1999).  Where single table bargaining operates, procedural agreements
between unions allocate seats on the joint negotiating committee according to the size of
union membership.  The joint negotiating committee presents a pay claim for all employees,
the details of which have been agreed between the unions beforehand.  Therefore the median
voter model will also operate in workplaces with multiple unions but single table bargaining.
For example, the procedural agreement between the management of the Rosyth Dockyard
and the six recognised non-managerial unions states:  “In matters affecting Pay and
Conditions of employment where a workplace ballot is conducted the majority decision
reached will be accepted by all union members” (Rosyth Royal Dockyard, 1992).   Finally,
workers’ solidarity is likely to be greater when workers receive roughly the same pay than
when they get different amounts.
These union preferences have long been remarked upon.  Forty years ago Slichter and
his colleagues (1960) concluded that within firms the role of unions “clearly has been one of
minimising and eliminating discriminatorily judgement-based differences in pay for
individuals employed in the same job” (quoted in Freeman, 1982).  Most recently Brown et
al. (1998) present detailed case study evidence from 32 matched firms, some which had
always had collective bargaining, some which derecognised unions and moved from
collective bargaining to individual determination, and some which had always used
individual contracts.  Their findings could not be more unambiguous.  For example:  “For
many firms, the advantage of breaking away from an existing structure of collective
bargaining was to increase the dispersion of pay, both within grades and between hierarchical
levels”.  Further “there was a greater tendency towards linking pay rises to individual
performance in derecognising firms than in those retaining collective bargaining.  Employers
tended to gain substantial discretion to set individual pay by open ended appraisal
procedures” (p.i).  And in those firms without collective bargaining, where pay still goes with
the job:  “One consequence of management’s increased authority is that job descriptions can
be left vaguer because employees can be expected to comply with greater flexibility of
working at management’s discretion” (p.28).
British unions have normally been antagonistic to subjective individual merit
Performance Related Pay schemes and guarded about company-wide PRP schemes like profit
sharing which cause employees to share business risks with capital.  Heery and Warhurst
(1994) surveyed the 61 largest trade unions and staff associations in Great Britain.  They
found that the introduction or extension of merit pay schemes had been the cause of industrial
disputes in a number of sectors including the civil service, education, banking and television.
The union responses (n=61) to merit pay were:
4Policy %
Opposed and committed to resistance 26
Opposed but prepared to accept 43
Pragmatic, neither opposed nor in favour 16
Supportive, ready to accept 7
Organisation advocates merit pay 2
No policy 7
TOTAL 100
Heery (2000) concludes from this and other evidence that “this kind of payment system
[merit pay] is associated with non-unionism and derecognition”.  A graphic example of union
opposition to merit pay comes from the Communication Workers Union who state:  “The
CWU and the union movement generally have consistently opposed the introduction of PRP
schemes and the notion that they improve overall performance.  The principle that employees
can collectively bargain with their employer over pay lies at the heart of the union
movements opposition.  Where pay is determined by a set of performance indicators, rather
than through collective bargaining, trade unions and the workers they represent lose vital
influence over pay and related matters” (CWU, 1999).
Profit-related pay schemes and Employee Share Ownership Schemes can, in principle,
cause fluctuations in pay consequent on risk sharing between labour and capital.  Unions
have therefore typically been cautious of such schemes.  However, such schemes have
normally attracted generous income tax breaks so unions do not automatically oppose their
introduction.  A recent Trade Union Congress paper stated:  “In the past the TUC has always
favoured collective forms of employee ownership.   However, unions have also negotiated
pragmatically on the role of employee share schemes in the overall pay package.  The general
policy stance might be described as engaged scepticism with the object of delivering the best
possible outcome for members” (TUC, 1999a).  Academic research has informed and
supported this shift in policy.  For example, Pendleton et al. (1995) found no evidence of
weakened union organisation where profit sharing or ESOS had been introduced.
2.2. Across workplaces and firms
At the turn of the century, the Webbs (1902) introduced the concept of ‘the common rule’
into the vocabulary of industrial relations and used it to define trade union objectives.  The
fixing of a standard pay rate – the rate for the job – was the pivotal common rule (see
Flanders, 1970).  Similarly in the United States “wage standardisation within an industry or
local product market is the most likely heralded union wage policy” (Slichter et al., 1960).
Pursuit of the rate for the job narrowed pay dispersion within the organised sector.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest two rationales for this common rule.  First, when firms
compete in the same market, both employer and worker interests can be expected to favour a
standard rate.  The firm does not want a labour contract that is more expensive than its
competitors.  And for the worker, it takes wages out of competition – there will be no
undercutting.  Second, union solidarity may be more difficult to maintain if some workers are
paid markedly more than others for the same job.
The strength of this common rule has ebbed away as the locus of collective bargaining
in the private sector has switched from national multi-employer agreements to firm or
workplace agreements.  Around one quarter of private sector employees are covered by
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national agreements.  Consequently the dispersion of pay in the organised sector is likely to
be higher now than it was two decades ago.  Interestingly, an analogous proposition has
recently been confirmed using cross country labour market evidence from OECD by Blau
and Kahn (1996) who found that countries with decentralised bargaining had greater pay
dispersion than those with centralised bargaining.
Nevertheless the organised sector is still likely to have less dispersion in pay, other
things equal, than the unorganised.  Gospel and Drucker (1998) show that in parts of printing,
textiles and clothing, multi-employer bargaining still sets “a minimum safety net of terms and
conditions”.  Further “national multi-employer regulation has survived in the construction
sector.  It has survived strongly in electrical contracting, where the relatively tight and
comprehensive agreement later provided a model for engineering construction”.  Similarly,
Jackson et al. (1993) describe union attempts to preserve an industry rate through pattern-
bargaining in supermarket retail and textile manufacture.
Local bargaining replaced national bargaining in a whole range of sectors during the
1980s, including engineering, buses, banking, cotton, textiles, independent television, food
retailing and manufacturing, docks, cement, newspapers, merchant shipping and wholesale
meat (Brown & Walsh, 1991).  But even in these sectors where national bargaining has
disintegrated and been replaced by local bargaining, unions’ own internal organisation permit
(even encourage) pay comparison.  We can identify four mechanisms by which this
comparison takes place:  (i) the role of the unions’ research departments and publications; (ii)
collective bargaining courses run by unions’ education departments; (iii) sectoral and
industrial meetings and conferences organised within and between unions; (iv) the role of the
full-time official.  Further, the reduction in the number of unions due to mergers, and the
subsequent concentration of the majority of union members into a handful of large unions has
strengthened (i) and (ii) recently.
All major trade unions now have research departments whose main function is to
provide research support for collective bargaining.  Key information collated includes:  data
on company performance, rises in the cost of living and comparative data from pay
settlements made by major companies and employers.  Most unions supplement their own
research-gathering facilities by subscribing to publications from specialist pay research
companies like Incomes Data Services and Industrial Relations Services.  This research is
then disseminated through union publications e.g. MSF Report, AEEU Review, GMB
Bargaining Brief and UNISON Bargaining Update.  These are all specialist publications
aimed at unions’ shop stewards and reps and they contain detailed briefings on issues like
changes to health and safety law and new employment legislation.  They also contain
information to use in pay bargaining such as details of settlements in other companies.
Further, in many unions reps have access to up-to-the-minute information on the latest
settlements being agreed within the industry via computer-held databases.
All the major unions have their own education departments.  The TUC through its
regional structure and, working in partnership with local further education colleges, organises
NVQ accreditation courses for about 28,000 official representatives and shop stewards each
year.  Such courses are a key way in which unions train activists to fulfil their role as
stewards or officials.  In addition to training in individual representation and employment
law, training in the conduct of collective bargaining is a key component of each course. This
includes substantive information on the arguments to present in making pay claims; for
example, changes to the cost of living, levels of previous pay rises, the current going rate for
pay settlements both within the industry and more broadly across the economy, and the
performance of the company.  Only this last variable is likely to vary markedly from
workplace to workplace.
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industrial level.  Smaller unions are internally cohesive because they represent workers in a
single occupation or industry; larger unions hold sectoral conferences and meetings.  For
example, the TGWU has a trade group structure where delegates from the different industries
which make up the TGWU’s membership come together for national bi-annual trade group
conferences, and more regularly at a regional level.  There even remain in existence inter-
union sectoral confederations from the era of sector bargaining.  One example of this is the
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) which holds an annual
policy conference, continues to maintain a district structure (albeit now largely moribund)
and national industry committees for aerospace, railways, shipbuilding and engineering
(CSEU, 1999).  The CSEU survives partly through union inertia, but also because single table
bargaining is now the norm throughout the engineering industry, therefore an element of
inter-union cooperation and coordination at a national level remains desirable.  The role of
these meetings in pay determination should not be underestimated just because they have no
formal role in formulating pay claims.  The networking and contacts built up among shop
stewards in different companies and workplaces are an important factor in maintaining the
idea of the rate for the job across companies and workplaces.
Even though most collective bargaining over pay in the private sector is decentralised
and is carried out by shop stewards at company or workplace level WERS98 reports that 57%
of union reps who conduct local negotiations over pay do so with the assistance of a full-time
union official (Cully et al., 1999).  It is likely that the presence or contribution of union
officials narrows the dispersion of settlements within the unionised sector compared with
dispersion where workplace reps negotiate unilaterally.  This results from the fact that the
FTOs bargain with the same broad objectives from workplace to workplace and play an
important role in shaping the preconceptions of what constitutes a “fair deal” among the reps
and members.
The impact of the first two mechanisms are likely to have been strengthened by
changes in union structure and organisation; most notably the concentration of union
membership into a few very large unions due to union mergers.  At the end of 1997 there
were 233 listed trade unions in Great Britain, less than a fifth of the peak number of 1,384 in
1920 (Bland, 1999).  Two thirds of union members are now in the nine largest unions, while
the smallest 109 unions have fewer than 1000 members each.  This change means that a high
proportion of union activists and negotiators get the information on which they base their
negotiations from a small number of sources.
Over half of union members work in the public sector and here the national rate for
the job mainly survives.  Well over one million nurses, teachers, doctors and dentists have
national pay rates set by arbitration (Review Bodies).  Some 0.3m police and fire-fighters
have national pay scales determined by indexation formulae.  Other Local Authority
employees (other than teachers, police and fire-fighters) total some 1m workers and include
education ancillaries, manuals, builders, engineers and white collar administrative,
professional and technical employees.  For these groups  the Local Government Association –
the national voice of the 420 Local Authorities – states (1997):  “Local government operates
a comprehensive system of national pay bargaining.  While the system is a voluntary one, in
that local authorities are not obliged to follow national agreements, for the most part national
agreements do apply” (para 4).
National bargaining remains the norm in other parts of the public sector too.  This
system covers, for example, over half a million health service ancillaries, prison officers who
are nearly all employed by central government and workers in the remaining public
corporations like the Post Office.
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with many employees being segmented into Agencies like the Benefits Agency, Child
Support Agency and the Information Technology Service Agency.  But even here the
Treasury still sets the parameters of the Agency-based negotiations.  Further, recent evidence
(Fernie and Metcalf, 1999) shows that the performance-related component of Agencies’
collective agreements contributes a small fraction of total remuneration.
Large chunks of the economy moved from the public sector to the private sector
through privatisation during the last two decades.  These privatised companies can be split
into two broad categories.  First, those companies like British Petroleum, British Leyland and
British Aerospace that operate within competitive product markets.  Second, those such as
British Telecom, gas, water, electricity and the railways, where the privatised companies
continue to enjoy a monopolistic or near-monopolistic position within their own product
market.  Companies that operated in competitive product markets were usually covered by
whatever type of national level bargaining operated within the industry.  Since privatisation
their bargaining behaviour has been typical of other firms within the same industry that were
always part of the private sector.  For example, British Aerospace abandoned national
bargaining when industry wide engineering agreements came to an end in 1991.  The
company now conducts bargaining at the level of the business unit or plant in line with the
rest of the unionised engineering sector.
The privatised utility companies and the railways have also shifted their bargaining
culture away from public norms towards behaviour more typical of private companies.
National bargaining across a whole industry (or in the case of BT and British Rail single firm
organisations) has been replaced by bargaining at company or business unit level, and
elements of merit pay have been introduced despite union opposition (see for example the
view of the CWU in BT cited above).  These changes mean that we can expect a widening of
the pay distribution since privatisation, but continuing union recognition should prevent the
pay distribution widening to the extent that we see in the non-unionised private sector.
2.3. Minimum wage
For most of the last century (till 1985) the union movement was hostile to the idea of a
statutory national minimum wage (NMW), believing a NMW would undermine collective
bargaining where it existed and inhibit its spread among unorganised workers.  Instead unions
operate a de facto minimum wage policy via collective agreements.  In 1998 (year of
empirical data for this study) there was no minimum wage protection in the unorganised
sector so it is to be expected that, if unions are successful at truncating the bottom tail of their
pay distribution, this too will contribute to lower pay dispersion for organised than
unorganised workers.
The Local Government Association (1997) confirms this role of collective bargaining:
“The lowest basic rate in our national agreement is £4.00 an hour [in 1997] i.e. this is the
assimilation rate for the lowest graded adult (aged 18+) manual workers e.g. cleaners and
catering assistants and the lowest pay point for adult clerical staff”.  In 1997 around 1-in-6
local authority workers covered by collective bargaining received this minimum rate – a very
noticeable spike in the pay distribution for such workers.
Individual unions operating collective agreements in the private sector confirm the
importance they attach to truncating the distribution.  For example the Transport and General
Workers Union recently stated (1997):  “Our active campaign for a £4.00 an hour minimum
wage [in collective agreements]… has led to negotiated agreements raising basic wages to
this level and beyond in a range of industries recently”.  It cites, for example, local
agreements signed on behalf of industrial cleaners in London, knitwear operatives in Scotland
8and bar staff in Belfast.  And national agreements with a similar impact cover cast stone and
concrete workers, Ministry of Defence industrial civil servants, the building brick industry
and the demolition industry.  Similarly, the shop workers union USDAW, reflecting on its
success in raising minimum pay levels among organised retail workers, stated (1997) that a
NMW “will provide protection for the unorganised, who are the most vulnerable”.
This important effect of collective agreements is confirmed by the detailed case
studies into wage and employment contracts carried out by Brown and colleagues (1998)
mentioned above.  They conclude:  “A central objective of some employers in individualising
was to steepen the gradient of pay across the organisation, taking advantage of the potential
for recruiting less skilled labour at lower rates than before”.
2.4 Summary:  our propositions
This discussion of union wage policies can be summarised in the form of six propositions:
Proposition 1.  In setting pay, workplaces where unions are recognised will make
greater use of objective criteria such as job classification and seniority.  Non-union
workplaces will make greater use of subjective performance appraisal and core competencies
than unionised workplaces.  This implies, in turn, that where contingent pay is used unionised
workplaces will have schemes based on objective criteria – share options or profits – whereas
non-union workplaces are more likely to use merit-based schemes.
Proposition 2.  Pay dispersion in the organised sector will be lower than in the
unorganised sector.  This follows directly from the union impact inside the firm, the remnants
of the common rule across private sector firms and its continuation in the public sector and
the truncating of the lower tail of the pay distribution among organised workers.
Proposition 3.  The move to decentralised bargaining – particularly in the private
sector – will be associated with greater pay dispersion now than when collective bargains
were mostly national multi-employer agreements.
Proposition 4.  The discussion above supports Brown et al.’s (1998) contention that
the gradient of pay will be “steeper” in unorganised than organised sectors.  Another way of
putting this is to say that the returns to extra human capital – experience, education
qualifications and training – will be, on average, lower for union than non-union employees.
Proposition 5.  There are two ways of looking at the incidence of low pay.  Among
workplaces, the likelihood of clusters of low pay is predicted to be lower where unions are
recognised than where they are not.  And among individuals, union members will have a
lower probability of being low paid, other things equal, than non-union members.
Proposition 6.  It is plausible that the de facto minimum wage role of unions means
that the union mark-up will be higher for relatively low paid workers than for the higher paid.
For example, higher for women than men, blacks than whites, those with health problems
than the healthy and manuals compared with non-manuals.  However, even if this is so it does
not follow automatically that unions compress the wage structure between each such pair.
That union effect also depends on the fraction of each group unionised. In the event, such
rates of unionisation are almost identical for each group in the pair (e.g. women and men), so
it is likely that unions do indeed narrow the wage structure.
3. Data
The propositions set out above are tested using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and
the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).  The LFS is a quarterly survey
of some 63000 households in the UK. All EU countries have their own Labour Force
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Europe.  The LFS was first conducted in spring 1973 and aimed to provide information on
the UK labour market.  Between spring 1973 and spring 1983 the survey was carried out
every second year.  In spring 1984 the survey became annual.  And from spring 1992
onwards the survey was conducted quarterly; March-May, June-August, September-
November, and December-February.
In each quarter of the LFS there are five waves, each made up of roughly 12,000
households.  Thus, in any quarter one wave of respondents will be interviewed for the first
time, one wave for the second, one for the third, one for the fourth and one wave for the fifth
and final time.  About 30% of LFS responses are proxy responses, that is the answers have
been provided by another member of the same household if the respondent was unavailable.
Income questions were introduced to the LFS in winter 1992/3.  But until winter 1997
income questions were only asked of respondents in their fifth wave.  Since winter 1997
respondents have been asked about their income in both their first and final waves.  For this
research hourly wages were defined by dividing gross weekly pay by total usual hours
worked plus usual hours of paid overtime.  Those with wages under £1 an hour and over £150
an hour were dropped from the analysis.  Also dropped were those aged under 18, over 59
(women) or 64 (men), full-time students and the self-employed.  Questions concerning union
membership have been available in the LFS every Autumn quarter since 1992.
The research reported here uses the Autumn 1998 LFS.  This provides earnings
information for a sample of over 16,000 people.  Autumn 1998 was chosen because there was
no statutory minimum wage protection then, important for testing Propositions 5 and 6.  The
winter 1998/9 pay data would be affected as firms adjusted pay structures in anticipation of
the NMW, introduced in April 1999.
Our second data source is the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey
(WERS98).  (Cully et al, 1999 provide full details of the survey and information on previous
surveys in 1980, 1984 and 1990).  WERS98 collected detailed information from 2191
workplaces with ten or more employees - the largest survey of its kind in the world.  15.8
million people work in workplaces with ten or more employees, three quarters of employees
in employment in Britain.  Large workplaces were over-sampled, but the use of weighting
variables allow results to be representative of all British workplaces with ten or more
employees.
According to those responsible for the survey it aims to “examine what is, rather than
what ought to be, the current situation [in employment relations].  It is uniquely well placed
to do this, because of the manner in which the survey is founded, organised and conducted”
(Cully et al., 1998:1).  The sponsoring bodies are the Department of Trade and Industry, The
Economic and Social Research Council, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
and the Policy Studies Institute.  The survey was designed by a small team from the
sponsoring bodies in conjunction with leading academics in the field.  The interviewing was
conducted by Social and Community Planning and Research between October 1997 and June
1998.
WERS98 comes in three parts.  The first part is a management questionnaire,
completed by senior managers responsible for the management of employee relations in the
workplace.  The response rate for this section of the survey was 80%.  The second section is a
worker representatives questionnaire:  950 worker representatives were interviewed, a
response rate of 83% from workplaces with a worker representative.  In a departure from
previous WERS surveys, WERS98 also contains a short employee questionnaire.  These
questionnaires were distributed to 25 randomly chosen employees in each workplace.
Completed questionnaires were returned by 28,323 employees, about two-thirds of those
distributed.
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WERS98 contains a wealth of detail on pay levels and systems and collective
representation, along with extensive information on workplace characteristics, allowing us to
control for other factors that may influence pay systems and the distribution of pay.  The
section on representation at work contains information on three key areas.  First, the type of
relationship between management and unions; if the management recognises unions for
collective bargaining, individual representation or neither.  Second, the structure of
workplace trade unionism – the extent of multi-unionism, and the unionisation levels among
different occupational groups.  Third, the strength of the union indicated by whether a pre or
post-entry closed shop exists, and the percentage of employees that are union members.  The
section on payment systems and pay determination asks questions about different types of
variable pay schemes present in the workplace; which occupational groups they are applied
to; and the extent of participation in schemes like employee share ownership in the
workplace.  The worker representative questionnaire allows the responses in the management
questionnaire to be verified.  Overall the high response rates make information derived from
WERS98 extremely reliable.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1 Unions and payment systems
Unionised workplaces differ markedly from non-union ones concerning the factors that
influence pay levels among (full-time) employees in the largest occupational group (see
Table 2).  Unionised workplaces are more likely to pay according to the job and less likely to
use performance appraisal and merit pay.  This confirms our discussion of unions’ preference
for objective over subjective measures.  Similarly, non-union workplaces are more likely to
opt for a competency approach to pay than their union counterparts, the latter are more likely
to use formal qualifications than are non-union workplaces.
Seniority influences pay in half of union workplaces but in only a quarter of non-
union ones.  This demonstrates the importance of procedural justice in the organised sector.
Seniority is a mechanism by which unions enforce non-arbitrary procedures for pay and
promotion and so any pay differentials arising out of seniority-based systems are compatible
with union goals.  Although age-related pay is not common in either sector it is more likely to
be found in non-union than union workplaces.  This confirms recent evidence given to the
Low Pay Commission in connection with the youth wage.  The TUC (1999b) stated it “is
strongly opposed to the lower rate for younger workers”.  By contrast the British Chamber of
Commerce, representing smaller non-union companies stated that its members are “strongly
in favour of lower youth minimum wages”.  The evidence in Table 2 supports Proposition 1
concerning the greater use of objective criteria in pay setting in unionised workplaces.
The association between union recognition and use of particular types of payment
system is set out in Table 3.  Two separate samples of workplaces were used – all workplaces
and those in the private sector.  This is because public sector employees are ineligible for
certain contingent pay such as share ownership schemes and profit related pay.  Many
controls were included (see note to Table 3) because use of different payment systems may
be influenced by factors such as workplace size or the characteristics of the labour force.
For the whole sample union recognition is associated with a lower incidence of
individual or group based performance related pay schemes (which include merit pay).  But
this seems to reflect less use by public sector workplaces because there is no such association
for the private sector sample.  Within the private sector unionised workplaces are more likely
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to make use of employee share ownership schemes than their non-union counterparts.  This
partly reflects union preferences for objective schemes.  It also suggests a pragmatic response
to such schemes:  the value of the tax breaks provided by the Treasury to promote the use of
such schemes offsets the implied risk-sharing element inherent in the schemes.  There is no
association between unionisation and use of profit sharing schemes or use of any contingent
pay schemes.
These results are consistent with Proposition 1 but provide only weak support for that
proposition.  When recognition is replaced by density similar links occur.  The results are
quite similar to those of Burgess (1999) who used the 1990WIRS and states that:  “strong
unions make a merit pay (subjective assessment) scheme less likely….  This favouring of
objective over subjective criteria, and favouring of collective rather than individual schemes
does not seem surprising”.
4.2 Unions and the distribution of earnings
Union members earn more than non-union members and their pay distributions are more
concentrated than the corresponding distributions for non-unionists.  The evidence is set out
in Table 4.  The fraction of each group unionised – around one third – is remarkably
consistent.  In each group union members have higher hourly pay than their non-union
counterparts.  But the dispersion in pay, measured by the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation divided by the mean) is, in every case, lower among union members than it is
among non-unionists.  For example, the average hourly pay of female union members is
£8.37, over £2 higher than that for non-union females, but the coefficient of variation for
union members is only 0.482 compared with 0.672 for non-unionists.
This evidence suggests that union wage policies such as common rates and lack of
enthusiasm for contingent pay causes lower dispersion in the pay distribution among union
members.  But, of course, this neglects the composition of employees and jobs.  It may well
be that people and jobs in the unionised sector of the economy are more homogenous than
those in the non-union sector and that this is the reason why the union wage distribution is
narrower than the non-union distribution.  This possibility is investigated in Table 5.
Three measures of the dispersion of log earnings are presented, the standard deviation,
the 90th percentile minus the 10th percentile and the variance.  Consider initially the raw
earnings data.  In every case, on all three dispersion indicators, the union pay distribution is
more concentrated than the non-union pay distribution, confirming the information in Table
4.
Now consider the dispersion in the residuals from a regression equation which permits
controls for the heterogeneity of people and jobs between the union and non-union sectors.
The control variables are set out in the notes to the table and include age, qualifications,
workplace size, industry, and (most importantly) occupation – to control for the lower
incidence of union membership at the top and bottom of the pay distribution.  Two strong
findings occur.  First, considerable pay dispersion remains even when controls are included.
The dispersion in the residuals is around two thirds the dispersion in the raw data.  (This is
simply another way of saying that earnings functions leave much of the variance in pay
unexplained.)  Second, it remains the case that, on every measure of dispersion, even when
we essentially compare homogeneous employees in similar workplaces and jobs, that pay
dispersion is lower for union members than for non-union employees.  Thus union wage
policies do matter – the lower dispersion in pay among unionists is not just because they are
more similar than non-unionists.  This confirms Proposition 2.
It was predicted in Section 2 that, while pay dispersion would be lower in the
organised than the unorganised sector, the move to decentralised bargaining – particularly in
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the private sector – will have caused dispersion to increase among union members.  This
prediction is strongly supported by the evidence.  Metcalf (1982) reported the coefficient of
variation among organised (and unorganised) workers for 1978, which was typically only
some two thirds as large as the corresponding coefficient of variation two decades later
reported in Table 4.  Thus the move away from national bargaining and the common rule rate
for the job is associated, not surprisingly, with greater pay inequality in the organised sector.
This confirms Proposition 3.
One reason that the dispersion in pay among unionised workers is lower than among
their non-union counterparts is because in unionised workplaces pay is based more on jobs
and less on individual characteristics.  Hence the characteristics of workers which raise pay
have a smaller effect in unionised workplaces and, in turn, inequality is smaller in union than
in non-union workplaces.
Consider, for example, the payoff to extra human capital – experience and
qualifications – set out in Table 6.  The returns to labour market experience (proxied by age)
indicate that, as compared with those aged under 25, prime age union members earn 37%
more while prime age non-union members earn 48% more.  The same pattern holds for
women but the absolute gap is less pronounced.
Similarly, for men, the returns to higher qualifications are greater and the profile is
steeper among the non-union group than for union members.  For example a union member
with A-levels as his highest qualification earns 34% more than a member with no
qualifications whereas the corresponding non-union man is paid 53% more.  These results
confirm Proposition 4.  However, the same pattern does not hold for females, possibly
because many of the higher paid female jobs like teachers and nurses are in the more highly
unionised public sector.
These lower returns to human capital in the organised sector may well be a cause for
concern for trade unions.  It is possible that workers sort themselves, or are sorted by their
potential employers, such that the more able prefer to work in non-union firms where they
can get a higher payoff to their costly investment in human capital.  Booth and Frank (1999),
for example, show that men gain only 5% from the use of performance-related pay in the
union sector, versus 12% in the non-union sector.
Returns to workplace size are also presented in Table 6.  The payoff to being in a
larger workplace (50+ employees) is some three times higher for non-unionists than for union
members.  For example, as compared with those in small workplaces with fewer than 25
employees, non-union women earn 15.6% more whereas union members earn only 4.4%
more.  There are a number of possible explanations for the fact that the employer size wage
effect is larger in the non-union sector.  For example it is generally held (Lazear 1986) that it
is more costly to monitor effort in larger than in smaller workplaces.  Possibly unionised
employers plump for greater supervision in large workplaces whereas those without unions
adopt efficiency wage policies.   Alternatively, Green et al. (1996) present a monopsony
model where “we would expect unions to reduce the size-wage effect because unions tend to
raise wages but an upper bound on wages is given by the marginal product.  Hence wages get
squashed into a smaller gap.”  (p.440.)
4.3 Unions and the incidence of low pay
It was predicted in Section 2 that union recognition would truncate the bottom tail of the
wage distribution.  We are very fortunate because the fourth Workplace Employment
Relations Survey (WERS 1998) contained questions on low pay for both workplaces and
individuals.  Workplace managers were asked about the fraction of their employees earning
under £3.50 an hour at the time of the survey (mid 1998).  This information is available
13
separately for full-time and part-time workers.  The employee survey asked about actual
weekly pay and hours and this permits an analysis of the probability of earning below £3.50
per hour.  Such a benchmark is very convenient because it is equivalent to the £3.60 an hour
national minimum wage which came into force in April 1999.
Initial cross tabulations from the establishment data from WERS confirm that union
recognition is associated with a lower incidence of low pay (Cully et al. 1998):
% of workplaces with 25% or
more employees earning less than
£3.50 per hour
No union presence 16
Union present, no recognition 9
Unions recognised 2
Thus a mere 1-in-50 workplaces recognising have under a quarter of their workforce
earning below £3.50 per hour but the incidence of such clusters of low pay is eight times
greater in non-union workplaces.  These cross tabulations are informative but it is necessary
also to control for factors other than union recognition which influence pay, including human
capital, product market competition etc. McNabb and Whitfield (1999) have undertaken just
such a detailed exercise using WERS98 data.
Evidence on the link between unionisation and the incidence of low pay is set out in
Tables 7 and 8 where the unit of observation is, respectively, workplaces and individuals.
Consider workplaces first.  The sample is 1106 workplaces in the trading sector which are a
nationally representative sample of workplaces with 10 or more employees.  The dependent
variable is the percentage of employees earning below £3.50 an hour, which has a mean of
10.5%.  The unionisation variables are recognition, coverage of collective agreements and
union membership at the workplace but no recognition.  The control variables are set out in
note 3 to Table 7 and include workplace, workforce and product market controls.  Because
the incidence of low pay is left-censored with a significant proportion of observations having
a zero incidence of low pay the appropriate form of analysis is a Tobit equation.
The table provides evidence on the coefficients from the Tobit equation and the
marginal effects.  The coefficient indicates whether or not the variable is significantly
associated with the incidence of low pay.  The marginal effect indicates the magnitude of any
such association.  Consider the coefficients first.  It will be seen that union recognition and
coverage above 60% both reduce the incidence of low pay.  By contrast workplaces which
have one or more union members but which do not recognise unions have a higher incidence
of low pay than other workplaces.  This might reflect, for example, de-recognition of unions
by low paying firms.  It is noticeable that it is links between unionisation and the incidence of
low pay among full-time workers which drives these findings – none of the coefficients on
the union variables are significant when the dependent variable is confined to part-time
employees.
The marginal effects indicated that union recognition reduces the incidence of low
pay, other things equal, by 3.9 percentage points.  This is a substantial effect because the
mean percentage earning below £3.50 is 10.5%.  Where coverage of collective bargaining is
above 60% this reduces the incidence of low pay by a further 3.8 percentage points.  Thus
recognition coupled with extensive coverage (60%+) reduces the percent low paid by nearly
8 percentage points or some three-quarters of the mean.
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WERS also collected information on the pay of 19598 individuals of whom 3.4%
earned below £3.501.  For the sample as a whole both union recognition and union
membership lower the likelihood of being low paid (but the depth of coverage in the
workplace does not).  For men it is union membership that matters, whereas for women the
important thing is working in a workplace with recognised unions.  This distinction reflects
the fact that lower paid workers gain more from union recognition than the higher paid (see
below).  The marginal effects show the key role unions play in reducing the probability of
low pay.  Membership reduces that probability by 0.6 percentage points – from the mean of
3.4% to 2.8% - and recognition by 0.8 percentage points.  Taken together recognition and
membership lower the probability of low pay by over 1 percentage point (in this model the
marginals are not additive and the figure is lower than 0.6 + 0.8 = 1.4 percentage points) or
one third.
Taken together the results in Tables 7 and 8 unambiguously support Proposition 5.
To varying degrees union membership, union recognition and extensive collective bargaining
coverage each reduce the incidence of low pay.  This important effect of trade unions will be
somewhat attenuated by the introduction of the national minimum wage (NMW) in 1999 but
it is clear that, prior to the NMW, unions played an important role in truncating the lower tail
of the pay distribution.
4.4 Unions and the pay structure
The impact of unionisation on the pay structure by gender, ethnicity, health and occupation is
set out in Table 9.  The method of calculating the aggregate effect of unionisation on the
average pay of (say) females relative to males ( *D ) is set out in Ashenfelter (1972).
Approximately:
D * = (FPf – MPm) + (Df – Dm)
Where F is proportion of females unionised
M is proportion of males unionised
Pf is proportionate union/non-union wage advantage of organised female labour
Pm is proportionate union/non-union wage advantage of organised male labour
Df  is proportionate effect of unionisation on the wage of non-union female workers
Dm is proportionate effect of unionisation on the wage of non-union male workers
The effect of unionisation on male-female differentials is therefore composed of three
separate effects.  One of these is the effect of unionisation on the wages of non-union female
and male workers (Df – Dm).  These effects are unobservable – we know little of their size or
incidence – therefore *D – the proportionate female/male wage ratio in the presence of
                                                
1 This is approximately half the incidence of low pay calculated by the Low Pay Commission (1998).
There are two main reasons why this WERS estimate is lower. First, it is plausible that lower paying (more
authoritarian) managers were less likely to distribute this employee questionnaire to the selected workers.
Second, and more importantly, the hourly earnings for employees is calculated by dividing information on
broadly banded earnings (i.e. not actual) by actual hours.  Given these possible measurement errors and non-
response bias the evidence in Table 8 should be treated cautiously.
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unionism versus what it would be in the absence of unionism – cannot be estimated.  What
we can estimate is:
D @ D * – (Df – Dm) º FPf – MPm
D  is what can be observed and is the proportionate difference between the average
female/male wage ratio of all workers relative to the female/male ratio of non-union workers.
It is composed of two separate effects:  the respective proportions unionised and the
respective pay premiums.  However, it is plausible that the effects of unionisation on non-
union wages do not differ much by gender.  Hence it is reasonable to assume that *D@D .  In
what follows we therefore interpret the results as the impact of unionisation on the structure
of hourly earnings rather than the effect on the average (say female/male) wage ratio for all
workers relative to the female/male ratio for non-union workers.
The results reported in Table 9 and Table A.5 are quite remarkable.  Unionisation and
collective bargaining narrow the wage structure for each pair of groups.  The fraction of
employees who are union members is rather similar for each of the groups set out in the table:
in each case around one third of the group are union members.  Thus the impact of
unionisation on the pay structure comes via the premium associated with union membership.
In each case the lower paid group – females, non-white, those with health problems, and
manuals – receive a higher premium if they are a union member or covered by collective
bargaining than do their higher paid counterpart groups2.
Consequently the average wage structure is narrowed by the following percentages
compared with what it would be if there were no unions or no collective bargaining:
If there were no
Group Unions Collective bargaining
Wage structure would be wider by  %
Male-female 2.6 3.1
White-black 1.4 3.3
Healthy-health problems 0.6 1.2
Non-manual-manual 3.1 6.4
It should be remembered that many people think of unions as operating to the advantage of
able bodied, white male workers.  Indeed, recently Frances O’Grady, Head of the TUC’s
New Unionism project described unions as “male, pale and stale”.  If this were the case the
wage structure in Table 9 would be widened not compressed.
                                                
2 This paper is an exercise in industrial relations rather than econometrics.  But it should be pointed out
that there is some debate in the literature concerning the calculation of the union wage differential.  The most
thorough evaluation of the evidence has been presented by Swaffield (1999).  She concludes that OLS estimates
using cross section data such as that from the Labour Force Survey are modestly biased upwards because of
failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  But fixed effects estimates from panel data (not available in the
LFS) are biased downwards because of measurement error.  Thus there is no single best method to calculate the
union differential.  It is interesting and comforting to note that using both OLS and fixed effects estimation
techniques Swaffield finds (1999, Table 2), like us, that the union wage differential for females is larger and
more significant than it is for males.
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Heery (2000) points out that union success in raising the pay floor “is the primary
reason why union wage bargaining generates a bigger gap for unionised women workers:
women are more likely to be found in the lower reaches of the  pay structure and therefore
benefit more from the upward compression of earnings” (p.10).  He also notes that some
unions engage in ‘equality bargaining’ which gives priority to equal pay and equal treatment
and seeks reform of pay structures which operates to the detriment of women workers.  Heery
cites, for example, 1990s changes to pay and grading structures to combat indirect
discrimination against female employees in local government, electricity supply, banking and
retailing.  Unions have also sponsored women “pursuing equal pay cases against their
employers through the employment tribunal system as a means of putting pressure on
managers to negotiate the introduction of new job evaluation and grading procedures.” These
anti-gender discrimination policies by unions appear to be successful.  The evidence suggests
that union activity narrows the gender wage differential by some 3% compared with what it
would be in the absence of unions.  This confirms Proposition 6.
The TUC recently stated (1999a) that “trade unions themselves must constantly
review their effectiveness at attracting and encouraging membership amongst black workers
and at providing black members with a level of service which meets their individual
requirements and which also prioritises issues of discrimination”.  The evidence in Table 9 is
presumably just what the TUC is looking for.  It can point out that without unions the wage
gap between whites and blacks would be between 1.4% and 3.3% greater, again confirming
Proposition 6.
5. Summary and Conclusion
Writing four decades ago Allan Flanders (1961), the most thoughtful contemporary observer
of industrial relations, stated:  “trade unions can fairly be described as a ‘sword of justice’.
That is the continual social purpose which has fired their idealistic motivation” (p.21).  He
then asked:  “Are they now at the end of the road?”.  Greatly troubled by the unions’
somewhat opportunistic response to full employment he answered his rhetorical question
with pessimism:  unions “are not making the most of their own stirring music, their great
theme of the cry for justice, and by default seem only to be listening  to the clinking of cash”
(p.23).  Flanders response was, it seems, premature.  For, in this paper, we have shown:
· unionised workplaces continue to make greater use of objective pay setting criteria such as
job classification and tenure, and less use of subjective merit pay, than their non-union
counterparts
· although the move away from national bargaining to decentralised bargaining has caused
pay dispersion to rise, workers in the organised sector have much lower pay dispersion
than those in the unorganised sector.
· one reason for this is that pay in the organised sector is based more on jobs and less on
individual characteristics.  The return to extra human capital – experience and
qualifications – is substantially lower among union members than for non-unionists.
· before there was a national minimum wage unions truncated the lower tail of the pay
distribution.  Therefore the incidence of low pay was much lower in unionised workplaces
and among union members than in the unorganised sector.
· putting much of the above together, unions narrow the wage differentials between women
and men, blacks and whites, those with health problems and those without, and between
manual and non-manual workers.
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This evidence suggests that Flanders’ fears that the ‘sword of justice’ had been
blunted and corroded are unfounded.  Unions remain a major egalitarian influence on the
British labour market.
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Table 1
Union membership and collective bargaining coverage
                                                              % of employees
Coverage by
collective bargaining Total
Yes No
Union members Yes 25 6 31
No 10 59 69
Total 35 65 100
Note: Sample is 16,730 employees aged 18-59/64 excluding students for whom
information exists on hourly earnings, union status and collective bargaining
status. The information is weighted such that it is representative of the
population of employees.
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998.
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Table 2
Factors influencing differences in pay levels among full-time employees in the largest
occupational group within the workplace
% of workplaces
Factor
With union
recognition
No union
recognition
Performance or job-based
     Performance appraisal or assessment 18 37
     Incentive or performance related pay 22 27
     Job grade / classification 76 59
Skills or qualifications
     Skills / core competencies 35 55
     Formal qualifications 30 24
Seniority and age
     Years of service 51 26
     Age of employee 15 23
Hours
     Shift premia 27 19
     Overtime 51 58
     Hours worked 50 59
n                846           1044
Note: Weighted nationally representative sample of workplaces with 25+  employees;
managers responses, n=1890
Source: WERS 1998, Section F
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Table 3
Links between union recognition and use of different payment systems
Dependent variable:  use of payment system
indicated below All workplaces
Private sector
workplaces
Individual or group performance related
pay schemes
-0.065
(-2.25)
-0.029
(-1.00)
Employee share ownership schemes   — 0.107(3.01)
Profit related pay schemes    — -0.031(-0.81)
Any contingent pay -0.026(-0.72)
-0.009
(-0.28)
n          1699           1113
Notes:
1. Probit equation to allow for categorical nature of dependent variable.  Data in the
table refer to union recognition coefficients (t statistics) from the probit equation.
2. Control variables:  ownership (2 categories), industry (12), size (5), establishment
age, labour force characteristics (4) plus for whole sample public/private; and for
private sector sample product market competition.
3. Similar statistical exercise was used replacing recognition with density and the
resulting associations were very similar.
Source: WERS 1998, Section F for payment systems.
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Table 4
Union membership, pay levels and dispersion
Union members Non-union
% unionised
Mean
hourly
wage £
Standard
deviation £  CV
% not
unionised
Mean
hourly
wage £
Standard
deviation £ CV
Male 33.0 9.40 4.59 .488 67.0 9.10 7.09 .779
Female 30.8 8.37 4.03 .482 69.2 6.25 4.20 .672
White 32.0 8.93 4.40 .492 68.0 7.77 6.12 .788
Non-
white 31.5 8.91 3.62 .407 68.5 6.95 4.35 .626
Healthy 31.7 9.01 4.37 .485 68.3 7.88 6.20 .787
Health
problems 33.6 8.35 4.37 .523 66.4 6.71 4.80 .715
Non-
manual 32.1 10.24 4.74 .463 67.9 9.32 7.03 .754
Manual 32.1 6.89 2.68 .388 67.9 5.19 2.56 .493
Total 31.9 8.94 4.38 .490 68.1 7.75 6.08 .784
Notes: Sample size is 16730.  Non-whites refer to all ethnic origin groups other than whites.
Those with health problems are defined as people with a long term disability which
substantially limits their day-to-day activities or affects the kind of, or amount of,
work they might do.
Source: Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998
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Table 5
Unions and the distribution of pay
Raw Residuals
SD 90-10 Variance SD 90-10 Variance
Union 0.444 1.11 0.197 0.367 0.871 0.135
Male
Non-union 0.610 1.51 0.372 04.14 0.939 0.179
Union 0.464 1.18 0.215 0.308 0.679 0.095
Female
Non-union 0.521 1.25 0.272 0.371 0.815 0.138
Union 0.454 1.14 0.206 0.327 0.764 0.107
Healthy
Non-union 0.593 1.46 0.352 0.397 0.903 0.158
Union 0.476 1.17 0.227 0.333 0.740 0.111Health
problems Non-union 0.570 1.38 0.325 0.398 0.900 0.158
Union 0.459 1.14 0.210 0.331 0757 0.109
White
Non-union 0.595 1.47 0.354 0.399 0.904 0.159
Union 0.426 1.07 0.182 0.280 0.709 0.078
Non-white
Non-union 0.543 1.40 0.295 0.353 0.869 0.124
Union 0.441 1.07 0.194 0.319 0.712 0.111
Non-manual
Non-union 0.603 1.49 0.363 0.421 0.939 0.179
Union 0.386 0.96 0.149 0.326 0.775 0.106
Manual
Non-union 0.430 1.02 0.185 0.339 0.769 0.115
Union 0.457 1.14 0.209 0.330 0.768 0.109
Total
Non-union 0.592 1.47 0.351 0.400 0.904 0.159
Notes:
1. Sample size is 16730.
2. Standard deviation, 90-10 and variance from log earnings.
3. The residuals are estimated from a regression equation containing the following
independent variables:  age, qualifications, workplace size, industry, marital status,
public/private, full-time/part-time, permanent/temporary, gender,
able bodied/disabled, ethnicity, occupation and region.
Source: Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998.
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Table 6
Returns to human capital and workplace size
Male Female
Characteristics Union Non-union Union
Non-
union
Age
25-34 .220 .321 .236 .287
35-49 .370 .484 .290 .325
50+ .362 .458 .307 .339
Education
CSE/lower vocational .122 .143 .129 .084
O level/intermediate vocational .223 .267 .190 .150
A level/advanced vocational .344 .529 .332 .269
Teaching, nursing, higher voc. .427 .530 .509 .391
Degree .641 .738 .757 .659
Workplace size
25-49 .044 .101 .013 .042
50+ .086 .206 .044 .156
Note: Calculated from regression equations with same independent variables as set
out in note 3 to Table 5.  Excluded categories are:  age 18-24; no education
qualifications; 10-24 employees.
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Table 7
Percentage of employees earning below £3.50 per hour
Union Variable All Full-time Part-time
One or more union recognised at the workplace
· coefficient -0.14** -0.13* -0.21
· marginal effect (% points) -3.9 -2.3 -2.2
60% plus of employees in the workplace covered by collective bargaining
· coefficient -0.14** -0.20** -0.18
· marginal effect (% points) -3.8 -3.5 -1.9
Any union member at the workplace but no recognition
· coefficient 0.09** 0.19** 0.03
· marginal effect (% points) 2.4 3.1 0.3
Notes:
1. Sample is 1106 workplaces in trading sector from 1998 Workplace Employee
Relations Survey which is nationally representative sample of workplaces with 10
or more employees.
2. Mean of dependent variable is:  All 10.5%, Full-time 5.6%, Part-time 23%.
3. Control variables
Workplace:  size; public sector; how long at this address; foreign owned; industry
Workforce:  % aged under 20, over 51; disabled; ethnic minority; female; part-time
Product market:  growing market; sales revenue grew; market share above
25%; international market; many competitors; high level of competition; overseas
competition
4. Tobit analysis.   **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
Source: McNabb and Whitfield (1999, Table 10) from 1998 Workplace Employee Relations
Survey.
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Table 8
Probability that individual employee earns less than £3.50 per hour
Union Variable All Male Female
Union member
· coefficient -0.16** -0.43** -0.02
· marginal effect (% points) -0.6 -0.7 -0.1
One or more unions recognised at the workplace
· coefficient -0.22** -0.05 -0.30**
· marginal effect (% points) -0.8 -0.1 -1.7
60% plus of employees in workplace covered by collective bargaining
· coefficient -0.05 -0.22* 0.04
· marginal effect (% points) -0.2 -0.4 0.2
n 19598 10010 9590
Notes:
1. Sample is 19598 individuals from 1998 workplace Employment Relations
Survey.  This sample is from workplaces with 25 or more employees.
2. Dependent variable is calculated by dividing banded weekly earnings by actual
hours.   3.4% of sample defined as earning less than £3.50 per hour.  A dummy
variable (0/1) indicates whether or not the individual is low paid.
3. Control Variables
Individual:  age; qualifications; ethnic group; marital status; number of children.
Job Characteristics:  job tenure; job type e.g.  fixed, temporary, mainly done by
women.
Establishment characteristics:  size of workplace; size of organisation; % of
workforce by occupation, age, disabled, ethnic minority, female PT; foreign
owned; public sector; vintage.
4. probit analysis.  ** significant at 1%, *significant at 5%
Source: McNabb and Whitfield (1999, Tables 12, 13) from 1998 Workplace Employee
Relations Survey.
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Table 9
Impact of unionisation on pay structure by gender, race, health and occupation
Group Fractionunionised Premium
Union
impact
(ª)
Male .330 -.003 .026
Female .308 .087
White .320 .039 .014
Non-white .315 .084
Healthy .317 .039 .0055
Health problems .336 .053
Non-manual .321 .030 .031
Manual .321 .129
Notes:
1. Total sample size is 16489
2. Hourly pay premium associated with union membership estimated from
regression equation with the following controls:  age, marital status,
qualifications, part-time worker, temporary worker, industry, public sector,
workplace size, region and (as appropriate) gender, ethnicity and health.
3. In all the regressions but one the coefficient on unionisation is significant at better
than 1%.  Further, in each pairwise comparison the premia are significantly
different from one another at 5% or better:  See appendix Table A.3.
Source: Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998.
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Table A.1
Collective bargaining coverage, pay levels and dispersion
Covered by collective bargaining Not covered by collective bargaining
% covered
Mean
hourly
wage £
Standard
deviation £ CV
% not
covered
Mean
hourly
wage £
Standard
deviation £ CV
Male 36.0 9.31 4.49 .483 64.0 9.15 7.23 .790
Female 38.2 7.97 3.95 .495 61.8 6.26 4.37 .697
White 37.1 8.65 4.30 .497 62.9 7.87 6.33 .804
Non-white 37.1 8.95 3.89 .434 62.9 6.77 4.28 .603
Healthy 37.0 8.72 4.27 .490 63.0 7.98 6.41 .804
Health
problems 37.1 8.29 4.48 .540 62.9 6.66 4.78 .717
Non-manual 38.2 9.79 5.52 .462 61.8 9.54 7.34 .770
Manual 35.7 6.78 3.05 .450 64.3 5.18 2.36 .456
 Total 37.0 8.67 4.30 .495 63.0 7.84 6.27 .800
Notes:   See notes to Table 4.
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998,  n=16730
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Table A.2
Collective bargaining and the distribution of pay
Raw Residuals
SD 90-10 Variance SD 90-10 Variance
Covered by
collective bargaining .447 1.13 .200 .365 0.863 .133Male
Not covered .616 1.52 .379 .462 1.095 .213
Covered by
collective bargaining .456 1.16 .208 .339 0.78 .115Female
Not covered .538 1.29 .289 .418 0.935 .175
Covered by
collective bargaining .456 1.17 .208 .356 0.832 .127Healthy
Not covered .606 1.49 .378 .445 1.021 .198
Covered by
collective bargaining
.483 1.17 .233 .347 0.843 .120Health
problems
Not covered .572 1.37 .378 .404 1.008 .163
Covered by
collective bargaining .460 1.17 .211 .354 0.838 .126White
Not covered .607 1.49 .369 .444 1.023 .197
Covered by
collective bargaining .435 1.06 .189 .368 0.804 .136Non white
Not covered .547 1.38 .299 .442 1.031 .195
Covered by
collective bargaining .448 1.12 .200 .345 0.803 .119Non-manual
Not covered .618 1.54 .382 .454 1.026 .206
Covered by
collective bargaining .390 0.95 .152 .333 0.764 .111Manual
Not covered .434 1.04 .189 .349 0.809 .122
Covered by
collective bargaining .459 1.16 .211 .357 0.838 .127Total
Not covered .605 1.48 .366 .445 1.028 .198
Notes:  (i) Sample size is 16730; (ii) standard deviation, 90-10 and variance from log earnings; (iii) the
residuals are estimated from a regression equation containing the following independent variables: age,
qualifications, workplace size, industry, marital status, public/private, full-time/part-time,
permanent/temporary, gender, able bodied/disabled, ethnicity, occupation and region.
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998.
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Table A.3
Union and collective bargaining hourly pay premia
Union membership Collective bargaining
Group
Raw WithControls Raw
With
controls
n
Male .130 (10.03) -.003  (-.279) .120  (9.37) -.026 (-2.20) 8219
Female .334 (28.10) .087  (7.91) .293 (25.77) .057  (5.11) 8270
White .236 (25.31) .039  (4.76) .198 (21.80) .011  (1.27) 15796
Non-white .271   (6.36) .084  (2.14) .283   (7.03) .099  (2.58) 693
Healthy .231 (23.90) .039  (4.67) .191 (20.39) .010  (1.13) 14657
Health problems .294 (11.08) .053  (2.11) .279 (10.76) .042  (1.63) 1832
Non-manual .199 (17.07) .030  (2.86) .139 (12.28) -.032 (-2.95) 10209
Manual .305 (27.25) .129 (11.71) .282 (25.68) .146 (13.12) 6346
TOTAL .237 (26.05) .041  (5.13) .201 (22.73) 0.014  (1.69) 16489
Notes: Log earnings is LHS variable. Coefficients (and t values) as follows. Raw from regression containing only unionisation or
collective bargaining. With controls from regression containing controls specified in Table 9.
Source: Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998.
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Table A.4
Returns to human capital and workplace size
Characteristics Male Female
Collective
bargaining
Not covered Collective
bargaining
Not covered
Age
25-34 .236 .325 .241 .289
35-49 .400 .480 .328 .310
50+ .388 .454 .358 .316
Education
CSE/lower vocational .148 .130 .087 .097
O level/intermediate vocational .222 .264 .150 .170
A level/advanced vocational .310 .460 .246 .308
Teaching, nursing, higher vocational .459 .514 .463 .444
Degree .657 .734 .702 .695
Workplace Size
25-49 .060 .102 -.017 .047
50+ .080 .218 .005 .176
Notes:  See notes to Table 6.
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Table A.5
Impact of collective bargaining on pay structure by gender, race, health and
occupation
Group
Fraction
covered by
collective
bargaining
Premium
Collective
bargaining
impact
(ª)
Male .360 -.026 .031
Female .382 .057
White .371 .011 .033
Non-white .371 .099
Healthy .370 .010 .012
Health problems .371 .042
Non-manual .382 -.032 .064
Manual .357 .146
Notes and sources:  See Table 9.
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